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FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703:
THE BACK DOOR AND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE, TEN YEARS LATER
Ian Volek*
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows experts to form opinions using
information that is not admitted at trial, and even on evidence that is
inadmissible. In 2000, Rule 703 was amended to emphasize that it did not
serve as an exception to the other rules of evidence. When experts rely on
inadmissible evidence, the evidence can only be disclosed for the limited
purpose of assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion, and only if the
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. This Note reviews the application of Rule 703 before and after the
2000 amendment. It finds that disclosure of inadmissible evidence should
still be expected in a substantial number of cases, but nevertheless
concludes that the compromise approach struck by amended Rule 703 is
largely correct. Courts should, however, weigh the strong possibility that
limiting instructions under Rule 703 will often be ineffective (and logically
impossible), and reduce disclosure accordingly.
This Note also considers Rule 703’s intersection with recent changes in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. It argues
that, although Rule 703 allows expert reliance on inadmissible evidence,
the compromises struck by Rule 703 should not be allowed to mask
Confrontation Clause violations. Expert disclosure of testimonial hearsay
basis evidence should be understood as a Confrontation Clause violation.
Evaluating the expert’s testimony to see if it includes an independent
opinion, as suggested in some recent opinions, does not solve the problem.
An expert can both provide an independent opinion and convey testimonial
hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause.
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INTRODUCTION
“Expert” testimony on a multitude of topics appears in modern civil and
criminal trials.1 An engineer might provide an opinion on the operation of
equipment at a manufacturing plant.2 A doctor might opine about a
person’s physical and mental competence to enter into an agreement.3 In a
lawsuit over insurance, an expert might testify that a house fire was
deliberate, not accidental.4 Or, in a criminal prosecution, a police officer
might testify as a “gang expert” to provide information about the
background of a gang, or to translate gang code words for the jury. 5
Experts can obtain the information that underlies their opinions from
many sources. A doctor, for example, can develop specialized medical
knowledge by learning from teachers and colleagues during and after
medical school, by gaining practical experience treating patients, and by
reading medical journals and treatises. 6 The doctor can also rely on a
variety of sources to obtain information about a specific patient. The doctor
might obtain information from personal observation of the patient, from the
patient’s own description of his condition, from the patient’s family, from
other medical professionals, and from medical records.7 In the context of a
lawsuit, the doctor might also obtain information from the patient’s lawyer,
from legal documents, and by observing the trial itself.8
An expert in practice can thus rely on a variety of information. The rules
of evidence, however, restrict the information that a jury is permitted to
hear. 9 If an expert provides an opinion at trial, should the expert be allowed
to rely on all of the information that she would in practice, or should the
expert be allowed to rely on only the information that the jury can hear? An
expert’s background knowledge that forms the basis of her expertise may
present an unavoidable problem. The expert is useful precisely because of
1. Concern over expert testimony is not a modern phenomenon, however. Learned
Hand criticized expert testimony in a 1901 Harvard Law Review article. See generally
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901).
2. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1182–83 (8th Cir.
1997) (describing the testimony of a mechanical engineer called to offer an opinion on the
operation of a tank in a manufacturing plant).
3. United States v. Zandford, 110 F.3d 62, No. 95-5816, 1997 WL 153822, at *3 (4th
Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (describing the expert testimony of a neurologist and
general physician).
4. See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 611–13 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing
the expert testimony of a fire marshal that a fire was set deliberately).
5. United States v. Garcia, 447 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2006) (describing the
qualifications and testimony of a federal agent called as an expert witness).
6. See Paul D. Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473,
478–88 (1962) (describing the sources of general knowledge underlying a medical expert’s
opinion).
7. See id. at 488–514 (describing a medical expert’s possible firsthand and secondhand
sources of particular knowledge about an individual before trial).
8. See id. at 514–26 (describing possible legal sources that could supply a medical
expert with knowledge about a particular case).
9. FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note (“Not all relevant evidence is
admissible. The exclusion of relevant evidence occurs in a variety of situations . . . .”).
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her expertise, which may be impossible for the jury to acquire through
education at trial,10 and which the expert acquired without the rules of
evidence in mind. 11 To gain the benefit of expert testimony, the legal
system must recognize that knowledge. 12
The case-specific information that an expert might use, however, presents
greater problems. If the rules of evidence or other considerations 13 have
kept that information from the jury, should an expert be allowed to rely on
such information to form an opinion to be presented at trial? If the expert
does rely on such evidence to form an opinion, should the expert be allowed
to disclose this “inadmissible basis evidence” to the jury?
The common law restricted the structure of expert testimony and the
sources of information upon which experts could rely. 14 With limited
exceptions, the common law required experts to base their opinions on
information admissible at trial, which the experts could obtain at trial or
from their own observations outside of court.15 The common law strictures
ensured, in theory, that the jury knew the factual underpinnings of the
expert’s opinion and could accept or reject the opinion accordingly: “[A]
juror should be able to say, ‘My conclusion is in accord with the opinion of
the expert, not because he has expressed the opinion, but because he made
me understand the facts in such a way that my opinion is the same as
his.’” 16
The Federal Rules of Evidence loosened the common law restrictions on
expert testimony so that the information experts relied on to provide
opinions for trial could more closely correspond to the information they
would have relied on in practice (outside of court). 17 In particular, Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 allowed experts to rely on information that would not
be admissible at trial.18
Rule 703 left open the question of whether an expert could disclose
inadmissible basis evidence to the jury. Commentators advocated a variety

10. See Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts:
Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1993) (“Experts are often expert
because of years of specialized training, and thus there may be formidable barriers to
educating the fact finder about the relevant issues at trial.”).
11. See Rheingold, supra note 6, at 478–88.
12. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.1 (2010)
(explaining that we accept that an expert’s background knowledge is necessarily based on
hearsay).
13. “The exclusion of relevant evidence . . . may be called for by [the Federal Rules of
Evidence], by the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, by Bankruptcy Rules, by Act of
Congress, or by constitutional considerations.” FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note.
14. See infra Part I.A.1.
15. See infra Part I.A.1.
16. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 428 (1952).
17. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (“[T]he rule is designed to broaden the
basis for expert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial
practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.”).
18. FED. R. EVID. 703 (“If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”).
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of approaches. 19 One approach feared the use of experts as “conduits” or a
“back door” through which parties could put inadmissible evidence before
the jury. 20 This approach would have prevented the expert from discussing
the inadmissible basis evidence in any detail.21 An opposing approach
argued that information relied on by experts should be disclosed to the jury
for substantive consideration. 22 A third approach, charting a middle course
that tended to be followed by courts,23 argued that inadmissible basis
evidence should be disclosed to the jury for the limited purpose of
explaining the expert’s opinion, subject to an evaluation of the probative
value and prejudicial effect of the evidence under Rule 403. 24
In 2000, Rule 703 was amended to confirm that courts should take an
approach along the lines of this middle course.25 Amended Rule 703
clarified that Rule 703 did not function as an exception through which
otherwise inadmissible evidence could be admitted.26 It also created a
presumption that the jury should not hear inadmissible basis evidence relied
on by an expert. 27 Under amended Rule 703, inadmissible basis evidence
that an expert has relied on can be disclosed to the jury for the limited
purpose of assisting the jury’s evaluation of the expert’s opinion, but only if
the probative value of the evidence “substantially outweighs” the
prejudicial effect of disclosure to the jury. 28 Rule 703 thus reverses the
default presumption of disclosure under Rule 403 to create a presumption
against disclosure even for the limited purpose of explaining the expert’s
opinion. 29
It has been more than ten years since the amendment of Rule 703.30 This
Note revisits the controversy leading to the amendment and examines the
19. See infra Part I.B.3.
20. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in Opinion
Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859, 859–66 (1992) (describing “the problem of backdoor
hearsay through expert opinion”).
21. See infra Part I.B.3.a.
22. See infra Part I.B.3.b.
23. See Allen & Miller, supra note 10, at 1135 (describing “the current practice of the
courts of admitting the underlying data for the purpose of appraising the opinion”).
24. See infra Part I.B.3.c. According to Rule 403, “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
25. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment. This Note uses
the text of the rules as currently in force at the time of publication. On December 1, 2011,
barring congressional action to the contrary, restyled rules will go into effect. The restyling
was designed to be non-substantive, and thus should not impact case law precedent or the
analysis in this Note. See Federal Rules of Evidence—2011 Pending Amendment to Restyle
the
Federal
Rules
of
Evidence,
FED.
EVIDENCE
REVIEW,
http://federalevidence.com/node/1051 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
26. See id.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
28. See id.
29. Compare id. (“Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed . . . unless . . . their probative value . . . substantially outweighs their prejudicial
effect.”), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (“[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”).
30. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment.
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application of amended Rule 703. Part I of this Note discusses the
evolution of the rules governing disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence,
from the common law to amended Rule 703. Part II discusses the
application of amended Rule 703 in the courts, including the effect of the
amendment to Rule 703 in closing a back door to inadmissible evidence.
As discussed in Part II, the amendment to the Rule may have curbed
disclosure of inadmissible evidence to some degree, but disclosure can still
be expected in a substantial number of cases. Part II also addresses the
implications of recent changes in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence for
the treatment of inadmissible basis evidence. Part III discusses Rule 703 in
view of experience under the amended Rule, and concludes that Rule 703
struck an appropriate compromise, but that courts should place additional
emphasis on the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions under the Rule.
The approaches taken in Rule 703 should not, however, be allowed to
obscure Confrontation Clause problems inherent in some expert testimony.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
This part discusses the background and evolution of Rule 703. Part I.A
addresses the common law background of Rule 703 and Rule 703’s
broadening of the common law restrictions on the permissible bases of
expert testimony. Part I.B discusses approaches for treating disclosure of
inadmissible basis evidence under Rule 703. Part I.C addresses the 2000
amendment to Rule 703.
A. The Permissible Bases and Form of Expert Testimony Under the
Common Law and the Federal Rules of Evidence
Expert testimony can be understood as having a syllogistic structure.31
An expert applies specialized knowledge (the major premise) to information
specific to the case at hand (the minor premise) to reach a conclusion.32
For example, a physician might testify that the plaintiff in a personal injury
action had a brain injury. 33 The physician’s major premise could be that the
presence of particular symptoms A, B, and C indicates brain injury D.34
The plaintiff’s actual symptoms would form the physician’s minor
premise. 35 For example, assume the plaintiff exhibited symptoms A, B, and
C. By applying the major premise to the minor premise, the expert could
conclude that the plaintiff suffered from brain injury D. 36 Both the major
and minor premises implicate inadmissible basis evidence.37 This Note
31. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The ‘Bases’ of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic
Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988); see also Julie A. Seaman,
Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion
Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 837 n.38 (2008) (“Professor Imwinkelried’s syllogistic
framework remains the most helpful way of thinking about this process.”).
32. See Imwinkelried, supra note 31, at 2–3.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 39–58 and accompanying text.
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focuses on the minor premise, the case-specific data that an expert has
relied on in forming an opinion. Common law rules strictly regulated the
case-specific evidence underlying expert opinions. 38 The Federal Rules of
Evidence loosened these restrictions, as will be discussed in Part I.A.2.
1. Restrictions on the Bases and Form of Expert Testimony
at Common Law
At common law, much of the information that an expert might rely on
Expertise developed through firsthand
was inadmissible hearsay. 39
practical experience presented little problem, 40 but the majority rule at the
end of the nineteenth century held “that standard medical and scientific
works are inadmissible in evidence as proof of the declarations or opinions
which they contain.” 41 Thus, to the extent that the expert learned from
others or by reading, the expert had relied on hearsay. 42 Nevertheless, the
common law recognized that experts frequently acquired their knowledge
from hearsay, and that “to reject a professional physician or mathematician
because the fact or some facts to which he testifies are known to him only
upon the authority of others would be to ignore the accepted methods of
professional work and to insist on finical and impossible standards.”43
Thus, the common law accepted that an expert’s general knowledge often
came from inadmissible evidence.
The expert’s case-specific knowledge, however, presented a greater
problem. The common law restricted both the sources of case-specific
information on which an expert could permissibly rely and the form of the
expert’s testimony at trial.44 These rules sought to ensure that the expert
relied only on admissible evidence and that the jury knew the basis of the

38. See infra notes 44–58 and accompanying text.
39. See Daniel D. Blinka, “Practical Inconvenience” or Conceptual Confusion: The
Common-Law Genesis of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 467, 484,
488 (1997). As currently defined by the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The definition of
hearsay in the Federal Rules reflects the common law understanding of hearsay. See 3 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 1361 (2d ed. 1923).
40. Blinka, supra note 39, at 484.
41. HENRY WADE ROGERS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 166 (2d ed. 1891); see
also FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee’s note (noting that “the great weight of
authority has been that learned treatises are not admissible as substantive evidence though
usable in the cross-examination of experts”); Blinka, supra note 39, at 485–87. An
exception existed for “books that relate[d] to the exact sciences,” or that by longstanding use
had become widely recognized as the type of authority that people relied on to govern their
lives. ROGERS, supra, § 163. This exception permitted admission in evidence of “almanacs,
astronomical calculations, tables of logarithms, mortuary tables for estimating the probable
duration of life at a given age, tables of weights and measures, and of currency,
chronological tables, interest tables, and annuity tables.” Id.; Blinka, supra note 39, at 485.
42. Blinka, supra note 39, at 484.
43. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 665; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5;
ROGERS, supra note 41, §§ 19, 162; Blinka, supra note 39, at 485–87.
44. See Blinka, supra note 39, at 487–90.
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expert’s testimony. 45 As a result, the jury could (at least in theory) evaluate
the basis of the expert’s testimony and accept or reject the expert’s opinion
accordingly. 46
More specifically, the common law generally limited the permissible
case-specific bases of expert testimony to two sources. 47 First, the expert
could testify based on the expert’s personal observations.48 Second, the
expert could testify based on information admitted at trial. 49 The expert
could obtain this information by attending the trial and listening to the same
information as the jury. 50 Alternatively, and more commonly, the expert
could be presented with the information in a hypothetical question at trial.51
The expert was not limited to one source of information or the other: an
expert who had knowledge obtained by personal observation could also
learn additional facts at trial. 52
Limited exceptions allowed experts to rely on certain inadmissible casespecific information, and to disclose the information to the jury. 53 Experts
on the valuation of property were permitted to rely on inadmissible hearsay
such as evidence of price lists or comparable sales. 54 This exception
allowed courts to use information that experts commonly relied on outside
of court, without imposing unnecessary costs on the court and the parties.
In addition, a treating physician was permitted to rely on his patient’s
description of his condition. 55 As Dean John Henry Wigmore pointed out,
45. See id.
46. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.4, at 151 (noting that the hypothetical question,
which was required in certain circumstances at common law, in theory, “provided the jury
with a clear exposition of the expert’s basis, so that it could decide whether to believe the
premises and whether the expert’s conclusions properly followed from them”); Blinka, supra
note 39, at 488 (“What good was the expert’s opinion, then, unless both the expert and the
jury concurred in what was said or done in this specific case?”).
47. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL.,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 703.02[1] (9th ed. 2006).
48. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489;
JoAnne A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C. L. REV.
53, 56–57 (1994). For example, a doctor could present an opinion based on his firsthand
examination of a patient. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (citing Rheingold,
supra note 6, at 489).
49. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90;
Epps, supra note 48, at 56–57. For example, an expert providing an estimate of damages
suffered by a plaintiff would rely on evidence admitted at trial, instead of personal
observation. Epps, supra note 48, at 62.
50. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; SALTZBURG ET AL, supra note 47,
§ 703.02[1]; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90; Epps, supra note 48, at 56–57.
51. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; SALTZBURG ET AL, supra note 47,
§ 703.02[1]; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90; Epps, supra note 48, at 57 & n.20.
52. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 678.
53. KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5.1.
54. Id.; Epps, supra note 48, at 56 & n.19.
55. ROGERS, supra note 41, § 47; 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 688; Blinka, supra note
39, at 496–98; Epps, supra note 48, at 56 & n.18. The patient’s statements about his present
physical condition for the purpose of treatment were at the core of the exception. Statements
by the patient to a non-treating physician and statements by the patient about his medical
history or the cause of his condition were viewed less favorably. Blinka, supra note 39, at
497–98.
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“[T]he law cannot afford to stultify itself by refusing to recognize, in
testimonial rules, the safe and accepted practices of medical science.”56
The doctor relied on the patient’s statements in medical practice. The law
should not prevent the doctor from doing so at trial.57 Courts justified these
exceptions by pointing to expert reliance on the information outside of
court, efficiency, and the expert’s own validation of the information.58
The common law also limited the form of the expert’s testimony. When
the expert relied on personal observations, the rule at the end of the
nineteenth century required the expert to disclose the observations before
providing his opinion. 59 In addition, when the expert relied solely or partly
on disputed information admitted at trial, common law rules required that
the expert testify by answering a hypothetical question (or questions).60
The hypothetical question was required to identify the premises of the
expert’s opinion, which ensured that the opinion was based on admissible
evidence, 61 and also allowed the jury to evaluate the bases of the expert’s
opinion. 62 Hypothetical questions thus served important theoretical
purposes. In practice, however, they were “difficult for the attorneys to
frame, for the court to rule on, and for the jury to understand.”63
Hypothetical questions could be quite long and complex,64 and subject to
bias. 65
The Federal Rules of Evidence both broadened the permissible bases of
expert testimony and loosened the common law strictures on the form of
expert testimony, as discussed in the next section.
2. Broadening the Permitted Bases and Form of Expert Testimony
by the Federal Rules of Evidence
Building on the exceptions provided at common law, 66 Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 broadened the permissible bases of expert testimony. 67 In
addition, Rule 705 loosened common law restrictions on the form of expert
testimony. 68
56. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 688, at 1097; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 4.5.1.
57. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 688, at 1097–98; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 4.5.1.
58. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5.1.
59. Blinka, supra note 39, at 489. This requirement was largely left to the trial judge’s
discretion by the middle of the twentieth century. Id.
60. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, §§ 676–78; Blinka, supra note 39, at 489–90.
61. Blinka, supra note 39, at 490.
62. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 680.
63. Ladd, supra note 16, at 425.
64. See, e.g., Barnes v. Marshall, 467 S.W.2d 70, 74 (Mo. 1971) (describing, in a case
relating to a decedent’s testamentary capacity, a question that “hypothesized much of the
evidence related by the other witnesses for plaintiff and utilize[d] ten pages of the
transcript”). One reported hypothetical question “extended over 83 pages of the reporter’s
transcript.” Ladd, supra note 16, at 427 (citing Treadwell v. Nickel, 228 P. 25 (Cal. 1924)).
65. Ladd, supra note 16, at 427; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.4.
66. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.5.1; supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
67. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
68. See FED. R. EVID. 705; FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
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Rule 703, which addresses “[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference,” 69 makes three possible
sources of information available to an expert.70 The first two sources
continue common law practices 71: under Rule 703, an expert can still
permissibly base an opinion on firsthand observation and on information
admitted at the proceeding. 72 In addition, Rule 703 built on and broadened
the permitted common law bases by adding a third source of information,
“facts or data . . . made known to the expert . . . before the hearing.”73
Under Rule 703, therefore, an expert can rely on information made known
to her outside of the hearing other than by her own perception.74 In
addition, Rule 703 provides that the evidence relied on by the expert need
not be admissible if the evidence is of a type “reasonably relied upon by
experts in the . . . field.” 75
The drafters justified these changes by pointing to rationales similar to
those that justified the more limited common law exceptions: the expert’s
practice outside of court, efficiency, and the expert’s own validation of the
evidence. 76 A doctor in practice, for example, bases a diagnosis on
information obtained from various sources. 77 According to the advisory
committee, much of this information would be admissible at trial, but only
at the expense of judicial resources.78 Allowing a doctor serving as an
expert to rely on such information—even if it is not admitted—“bring[s] the
judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when
not in court” and yields efficiency benefits. 79 Indeed, the doctor in practice
makes life and death decisions based on the information upon which she
chooses to rely. Therefore, an expert’s “validation, expertly performed and
subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.”80
Thus, with the adoption of Rule 703, an expert could rely on information
that was not admitted at trial and even on information that was not
admissible at trial.81
Rule 705, moreover, eliminated the requirement for the hypothetical
question and freed the expert’s testimony from the common law rules
69. FED. R. EVID. 703.
70. Id. advisory committee’s note. Rule 703 provides, in relevant part, “The facts or
data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing.” FED. R. EVID. 703.
71. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; see supra notes 47–52 and
accompanying text.
72. FED. R. EVID. 703.
73. Id.
74. Id. advisory committee’s note (“The third source contemplated by the rule consists
of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception.”).
75. FED. R. EVID. 703 (“If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.”).
76. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
77. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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requiring that the jury be made aware of the expert’s premises. 82 Under
Rule 705, a party may—but is not required to—disclose the information
underlying the expert’s opinion before providing the opinion.83 The
opposing party may, however, inquire into the basis of the expert’s opinion
on cross-examination, even if the basis is not disclosed by the proponent of
the expert’s testimony. 84
In combination, Rules 703 and 705 departed from the common law rules
that generally sought to ensure that the expert relied only on admissible
evidence and that the jury knew the basis of the expert’s testimony.85
Under Rules 703 and 705, the expert can rely on information inadmissible
at trial, and the expert is not required to disclose the bases of his opinion to
the jury. 86 Rules 703 and 705 as adopted, however, left open the important
question of whether or not inadmissible basis evidence could be disclosed
to the jury, and if so, for what purpose. This question is addressed in the
next section.
B. Disclosure of Inadmissible Basis Evidence to the Jury Under Rule 703
Under Rule 703, “[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data [upon which the expert relies] need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.” 87 Rule 703 as originally
implemented did not, however, address whether experts could disclose the
information that they had relied on to the jury if the information was not
admissible. 88 This omission from the Rule gave rise to disagreement about
the proper treatment of such evidence, and to concern that expert testimony
could be used to improperly place inadmissible evidence before the jury. 89
Part I.B.1 discusses what kinds of inadmissible evidence might be
disclosed under Rule 703. Part I.B.2 discusses options for addressing
whether, and to what extent, inadmissible basis evidence may be disclosed
to the jury. Part I.B.3 discusses conflicting approaches advocated by
commentators in the years leading up to the amendment to the Rule in
2000. And Part I.B.4 identifies the approaches to disclosing inadmissible
basis evidence taken by the courts.

82. FED. R. EVID. 705 (“The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise.”).
83. Id.
84. Id. (“The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data
on cross-examination.”).
85. See supra notes 44–65 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 66–84 and accompanying text.
87. FED. R. EVID. 703.
88. See id. advisory committee’s note.
89. See infra Part I.B.3.
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1. What Inadmissible Evidence Might Be Disclosed?
The debate surrounding consideration and disclosure of inadmissible
evidence by experts has focused primarily on hearsay. 90 When an expert
relies on a statement made by a person outside of the courtroom, the jury
cannot fully evaluate the reliability of the statement.91 Instead, the jury
must rely on the expert’s evaluation.92 An out-of-court statement is not
hearsay merely because it is repeated in court, however. Instead, as defined
by Rule 801(c), “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 93 Thus, if an expert in court repeats
an out-of-court statement, but not for the purpose of proving the truth of the
subject matter asserted in the statement, the statement is not hearsay. 94 This
distinction, and whether it is tenable in this context, is discussed further in
the following sections.
Nevertheless, Rule 703 does not limit inadmissible basis evidence to
hearsay. 95 Experts may also rely on information rendered inadmissible for
other reasons, including other rules of evidence and the Constitution.96
Moreover, hearsay and the Constitution intersect in an important
Confrontation Clause problem discussed in Part III.
In United States v. W.R. Grace, 97 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
the district court erred by precluding experts from relying on information
that had been excluded under Rule 403, without considering whether
experts could reasonably rely on the information under Rule 703.98
Information that the district court had determined to be “unreliable,
irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial” could nevertheless be relied on by an
expert if the other requirements for expert testimony—including
“reasonabl[e] reli[ance]” under Rule 703—were satisfied. 99

90. See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note; supra notes 39–58.
91. The value of a witness’s testimony depends on the quality of the witness’s
perception, memory, and narration of the subject matter of the testimony, as well as the
witness’s sincerity in testifying. See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s note. To
test these factors, the witness should preferably testify under oath, before the factfinder, and
subject to cross-examination. See id. (discussing hearsay). When an expert relays a
statement by an out-of-court speaker, these conditions are not met and the jury cannot fully
evaluate the speaker. Cf. id.
92. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note (arguing, although not in the
context of disclosure, that expert validation of basis evidence should allow the expert to rely
on the evidence in forming an opinion).
93. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (emphasis added). As used in the Rule, “statement” is broader
than the lay concept of a statement. The concept of “statement” for hearsay purposes
includes oral and written assertions, as well as nonverbal conduct that is intended as an
assertion. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
94. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
95. See FED. R. EVID. 703; id. advisory committee’s note; Blinka, supra note 39, at 535.
96. See FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee’s note.
97. 504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007). For the text of Rule 403, see supra note 24.
98. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d. at 758, 760–61, 763, 766.
99. Id.
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Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 100 addressed the admissibility
evidence of “other accidents,” which is admissible under Rule 404(b) in
product liability actions for certain purposes if the other accidents were
sufficiently similar to the accident at issue.101 In Nachtsheim, the court
affirmed a district court’s ruling that the “other accident” evidence was
inadmissible. 102 The plaintiffs also attempted to argue that the evidence
that another accident had occurred should have been admissible under Rule
703 through their expert witness, but were unsuccessful. 103
In Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 104 the Third Circuit explained that “[t]he
District Court and the parties [had] conflate[d] the separate issues of
whether [a “Safety Recall Instruction” (SRI)] itself can be admitted into
evidence and whether [the expert’s] opinion can be admitted if it is based
on a consideration of the SRI.” 105 While the SRI might be inadmissible as
a subsequent remedial measure under Rule 407, the expert could
nevertheless rely on the SRI in forming his opinion. 106 The court left open
the possibility that the expert could disclose his reliance on the SRI to the
jury. 107
In Anderson v. Terhune, 108 a convicted prisoner seeking habeas relief
unsuccessfully challenged his convictions on several grounds, including
that a juror slept during his trial. 109 Juror testimony and affidavits
concerning the sleeping juror were inadmissible under Rule 606(b). 110 But
100. 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 1268–70; Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule
703, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1253 (2007) (describing Nachtsheim and characterizing
“other accident” evidence as falling under Rule 404(b)). Rule 404(b) provides, “Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
102. Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1269–70.
103. Id. at 1270 n.11. For another example, see Peters v. Nissan Forklift Corp., No. 062880, 2008 WL 2625522, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2008) (order granting defendant’s
motion in limine), in which the court permitted the plaintiff’s expert to rely on inadmissible
“other accident” evidence if the reasonable reliance requirement of Rule 703 was satisfied,
but prevented disclosure of the evidence to the jury.
104. 520 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
105. Id. at 246–47.
106. Id. at 242, 246–47. Rule 407 provides in part that “evidence of . . . subsequent
[remedial] measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction.” FED. R. EVID.
407. But see Robenhorst v. Dematic Corp., No. 05 C 3192, 2008 WL 1821519, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 22, 2008) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion in limine)
(“Because Rule 407 prohibits the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
to prove ‘a defect in a product’ or ‘a defect in a product’s design,’ plaintiff’s expert cannot
rely on the post-accident modifications as a basis for his opinion.”). Although the court in
Robenhorst barred expert reliance altogether, it quoted the final sentence of Rule 703 (which
only addresses disclosure of otherwise inadmissible basis evidence to the jury) as support for
its decision. Id.
107. Pineda, 520 F.3d at 247 n.14.
108. 409 F. App’x 175 (9th Cir. 2011).
109. Id. at 178–79.
110. Id.
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the prisoner successfully introduced an expert report that relied on the
inadmissible juror testimony, because the expert could permissibly rely on
inadmissible evidence under Rule 703.111
Thus, under Rule 703, an expert can rely on information that would be
inadmissible under various other rules. Significantly, an expert might also
rely on information that would violate provisions of the Constitution if
introduced at trial. Expert reliance on hearsay that would violate the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is discussed in Part III.
Other possibilities include expert reliance on information obtained in
violation of a defendant’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights.112
Expert reliance on inadmissible information risks frustrating the policies
behind the Rules of Evidence or violating the protections offered by the
Constitution, particularly if the expert is allowed to disclose the
inadmissible information to the jury. 113 The next sections discuss ways of
addressing the issue of disclosure.
2. Evaluative Use, Substantive Use, and Limiting Instructions
Inadmissible basis evidence could be handled in a variety of ways. The
expert could be prohibited from referring to inadmissible basis evidence at
all. 114 Or, the expert could be permitted to refer to the inadmissible basis
evidence only in general terms. 115 Alternatively, the expert could be
permitted to disclose the inadmissible evidence to the jury, but only for the
limited purpose of evaluating the expert’s testimony (evaluative use).116
Finally, the expert could be permitted to disclose the inadmissible evidence
to the jury, and the jury could be permitted to use the basis evidence for
substantive purposes (substantive use). 117
Moreover, inadmissible basis evidence need not be always admissible or
always inadmissible (whether substantively or for a more limited use) under
Rule 703. The evidence could be admitted under some circumstances and
excluded in others. For example, inadmissible basis evidence could be

111. Id. at 178–79, 179 n.4.
112. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6, at 158 (discussing issues raised by expert
reliance on information obtained in “violation of the Confrontation Clause or the privilege
against self-incrimination, or as the product of an illegal search or seizure”).
113. See Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, No. CIV97-4014, 1998 WL 2017925, at
*4 (D.S.D. Sept. 17, 1998) (order denying defendant’s motion for new trial) (“Rule 703
ought not be used by a party to eviscerate the public policy purposes of Rules 407
(subsequent remedial measures), 408 (offers to compromise), 409 (payment of expenses), or
411 (liability insurance) . . . .”); KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6, at 158 (arguing that even
expert reliance on information that is inadmissible for constitutional reasons may pose
problems); Blinka, supra note 101, at 1249–54 (describing lawyers’ use or attempted use of
Rule 703 to circumvent other rules of evidence, including the rule against hearsay).
114. See Blinka, supra note 39, at 553 (citing State v. Weber, 496 N.W.2d 762, 766 n.6
(Wis. Ct. App. 1993)).
115. See infra Part I.B.3.a.
116. See infra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.B.3.b.
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admitted for an evaluative use or substantive use subject to some
determination of reliability or balancing of value and harm by the court.118
The evaluative use of basis evidence can be difficult to distinguish from
the substantive use. For example, in diagnosing a patient, a first doctor
might rely on a statement from a second doctor that the patient showed
symptom X. In testifying as an expert, the first doctor might tell the jury
that she relied on the second doctor’s statement. If the basis evidence (the
second doctor’s statement) is admitted for substantive purposes, then both
the proponent of the expert and the jury are permitted to consider the
second doctor’s statement as evidence that the patient did, in fact, have
symptom X. To alter an example given by Judge Richard Posner, “If for
example the expert witness (call him A) bases his opinion in part on a fact
(call it X) that the party’s lawyer told him, the lawyer [would] in closing
argument tell the jury, ‘See, we proved X through our expert witness,
A.’” 119 This approach would render the basis evidence admissible despite
the rest of the rules of evidence. 120 In this example, the basis evidence
would be admissible despite the rule against hearsay, because the jury
would be permitted to consider the out of court statement as proof of what
the statement asserted (that the patient had symptom X). 121
If, on the other hand, the basis evidence is admitted only for the limited
purpose of evaluating the expert’s testimony, the expert’s proponent and the
jury cannot use the basis evidence for its prohibited use (for the truth of the
statement made by the hearsay declarant, in this case), but they can use the
testimony for its permitted use (evaluating the expert’s testimony). The
proponent of the expert thus cannot argue that she has proved a fact by
pointing to inadmissible evidence that the expert relied on in forming an
opinion. 122 The jury can, however, use the basis evidence in considering
whether the expert is credible. To explain the prohibited and permitted uses
of the evidence, a court might give the jury an instruction like the following
one:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury. You have heard expert A testify that
she relied on [describe statement] in arriving at her opinion. You may
consider this statement only in assessing the credibility of A’s opinion.
You cannot use the statement as proof of [whatever is described in the
statement] even though A herself used it for this purpose. 123

118. See infra Part I.B.3.c. Ultimately, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 was amended in
2000 to adopt an approach along these lines. See infra Part I.C.
119. In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir. 1992). Actually, the
Seventh Circuit in James Wilson Associates viewed the expert testimony as an attempt to
circumvent the rule against hearsay. Id. at 172–73. Correctly quoted, the Seventh Circuit
explained, “If for example the expert witness (call him A) bases his opinion in part on a fact
(call it X) that the party’s lawyer told him, the lawyer cannot in closing argument tell the
jury, ‘See, we proved X through our expert witness, A.’” Id. at 173.
120. See Epps, supra note 48, at 64.
121. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
122. Blinka, supra note 39, at 548 n.460; see supra note 119.
123. Blinka, supra note 39, at 547–48.
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Limiting instructions like this one are used under the rules of evidence
when evidence can be permissibly considered by the jury for one purpose
but not for another. 124
Limiting instructions have been roundly criticized.125 Judge Learned
Hand called a limiting instruction “the recommendation to the jury of a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody’s
else.” 126 Research also suggests that juries have difficulty following
instructions on the law that they must apply. 127
Limiting instructions might be easier or harder for a jury to follow in
different circumstances. 128 One distinction that might be particularly hard
to make is the one between using the case-specific hearsay information
underlying an expert’s opinion for substantive purposes, and using it only to
evaluate the expert’s opinion. In evaluating the expert’s opinion, “one
cannot accept an opinion as true without implicitly accepting the facts upon
which the expert based that opinion.” 129 The expert used the underlying
evidence for its substance. When a jury accepts an expert’s opinion, it is
inherently accepting as true the facts upon which the expert has relied.130
The jury is thus inherently accepting the underlying hearsay evidence for its
truth. However, a limiting instruction in this context tells the jury to use the
hearsay evidence to evaluate the expert’s opinion but at the same time tells
the jury not to consider the hearsay evidence for the truth of what the
hearsay declarant asserted (even if the expert used the information that
way). 131 Such a distinction may be impossible.132

124. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the
court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.”); Blinka, supra note 39, at 528–34 (describing “limited admissibility” under
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
125. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1235–36 (“Courts and commentators have had a
veritable field day questioning, criticizing, and often condemning limiting instructions as
applied in particular cases and in general.”)
126. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
127. Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting
the Presumption that Jurors Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 197–201 (2004)
(summarizing research indicating that jurors have significant difficulty understanding jury
instructions).
128. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1235–36; Blinka, supra note 39, at 532–33.
129. Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A
Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 585 (1987).
130. Id.; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.7.2 (arguing that the underlying
evidence is only relevant if it is true, even if the jury only uses the evidence to evaluate the
expert’s opinion).
131. Blinka, supra note 39, at 547. According to Blinka, “Common sense alone exposes
the absurdity of such instructions.” Id.
132. Id. (“What does it mean to tell the jury that the evidence is received solely as it bears
on the weight to be given the expert’s opinion and then preclude them from using it in the
same way that the expert did?”); see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.7.2 (arguing that
the limiting instruction ignores the reality that evaluation of an expert’s opinion requires an
evaluation of the truth of the underlying evidence).
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Under Rule 105, moreover, a limiting instruction will be made upon
request. 133 A party may fail to request one, because of a failure to
recognize the inadmissible evidence or perhaps because of a tactical
decision not to highlight the inadmissible evidence.134 Rule 703 may thus
provide a conduit to present otherwise inadmissible evidence unchallenged
before the jury. 135 On the other hand, questions of litigation tactics posed
by limiting instructions is not limited to Rule 703, but rather extends
throughout the rules of evidence.136
When requested, limiting instructions hopefully educate the jury and
prompt it at least to try to use evidence only for its permitted purpose.137
Limiting the permissible use of expert basis evidence should also constrain
the way that the court and parties refer to the information. 138
If the jury cannot follow the limiting instruction, or if no limiting
instruction is requested, however, then the evaluative use option disappears
into substantive use. 139 That is, if the jury does not follow the limiting
instruction, then the jury has used the basis evidence for its substance 140
(assuming that the jury uses the information at all). In addition, if no
limiting instruction is requested, then the jury will not know that the
evidence can only be used for certain purposes. 141
After the implementation of Rule 703, commentators presented various
arguments for handling disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence. These
are addressed in the next section.
3. Advocacy for Conflicting Approaches for Treating Disclosure of
Inadmissible Basis Evidence Under Rule 703
After the implementation of Rule 703, commentators argued for several
possible approaches to treating inadmissible basis evidence.
One
possibility, discussed in Part I.B.3.a, would have limited experts to a
general description of the sources of inadmissible information. Another
133. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the
court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.”).
134. See Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 19 (2006) (“[A]ggrieved parties frequently forego limiting instructions for
fear that they will only emphasize the damaging inference.”); Blinka, supra note 39, at 546
(“[T]he opponent bears the burden of: (1) timely recognizing that the expert’s basis is
inadmissible for any number of reasons and (2) requesting a limiting instruction.” (citing
Epps, supra note 48, at 72–73)).
135. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1249–54 (describing lawyers’ use or attempted use of
Rule 703 to circumvent other rules of evidence, including the rule against hearsay).
136. See id. at 1229–46.
137. See Blinka, supra note 101, at 1236; Blinka, supra note 39, at 532.
138. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
139. Allen & Miller, supra note 10, at 1134; Blinka, supra note 134, at 54.
140. Blinka, supra note 134, at 54 (explaining that under amended Rule 703, which
provides for a limiting instruction, “absent an objection, the evidence is admitted for any
relevant purposes thanks to the working of the waiver rule”); Epps, supra note 48, at 72–73
(“The opponent . . . must shoulder the burden of asking for a limiting instruction.”).
141. See Blinka, supra note 134, at 54; Epps, supra note 48, at 72–73.
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possibility, discussed in Part I.B.3.b, would have interpreted Rule 703 as
making inadmissible hearsay admissible for substantive purposes. A third
approach, discussed in Part I.B.3.c, would have allowed consideration of
inadmissible basis evidence for the limited purpose of evaluating the
expert’s opinion, subject to the balancing test of Rule 403.
a. The Restrictive Approach
At one end of the range of alternatives, Professor Ronald L. Carlson
advocated an approach that would permit an expert on direct examination to
refer only to the sources of evidence that he relied on, if the evidence was
not otherwise admissible. 142 He argued that permitting an expert to quote
otherwise inadmissible evidence in court would violate the rule against
hearsay. 143 For example, if an expert relied on the opinions of three other
experts and disclosed their opinions to the jury, the proponent of the
testimony could effectively present the testimony of four experts to the jury,
while having to produce (and subject to cross-examination) only one of
them. 144 Professor Carlson also contended that permitting an expert to
disclose otherwise inadmissible basis evidence would “significantly
damage[]” a criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.145 In
particular, he feared that an expert’s testimony could be used as a back door
or conduit through which the prosecution could introduce a statement
without producing the speaker. 146
Carlson therefore encouraged courts to make the “fine but important
distinction between allowing an extra-record report to form a basis for
courtroom opinion and permitting the whole of the report to come into
evidence.” 147 This approach would not bar an expert from mentioning
otherwise inadmissible basis evidence altogether. Rather, Carlson would
permit an expert to “identify and briefly describe” the evidence on direct

142. Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 577, 584–86 (1986) (“Once the expert identifies the sources for his conclusions during
direct examination, the reference to outside material is complete.”); Carlson, supra note 20,
at 869–71 (arguing that Rule 703 should be amended to limit the circumstances under which
otherwise inadmissible basis evidence can be disclosed to the jury).
143. Carlson, supra note 142, at 584 (“To . . . allow the admission of an unauthenticated
writing into evidence or to permit the testifying expert to quote extensively from that writing
violates accepted hearsay norms.”).
144. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts, Judges, and Commentators: The Underlying Debate
About an Expert’s Underlying Data, 47 MERCER L. REV. 481, 482–83 (1996).
145. Ronald L. Carlson, In Defense of a Constitutional Theory of Experts, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 1182, 1184 (1993) (arguing that permitting the disclosure of inadmissible basis
evidence “would decimate the tenets” of the Confrontation Clause); Carlson, supra note 142,
at 585.
146. Carlson, supra note 20, at 859–64; Carlson, supra note 142, at 585 (“This back door
introduction of the contents of a nontestifying expert’s report, without producing the author
of the material, impinges on the criminal defendant’s sixth amendment rights.”).
147. Carlson, supra note 142, at 584; see also Carlson, supra note 20, at 866.
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examination. 148 In limited circumstances within the discretion of the court,
more information might be admissible.149
According to Carlson, the details of otherwise inadmissible basis
evidence should not be admitted even to help the jury evaluate the basis of
the expert’s opinion. 150 He saw too much danger for misuse. 151 The jury
would be unable to see the distinction between use of the evidence for its
substance and use of the evidence to explain the expert’s testimony: “[I]t
would be mythical to expect the jury simply to consider its illustrative
Carlson therefore
effect and disregard its substantive content.” 152
characterized the attempt to admit otherwise inadmissible basis evidence for
the purpose of explaining the expert’s testimony as a “subterfuge” that
should not be permitted to circumvent the rule against hearsay. 153
b. The Open Approach
At the other end of the range of alternatives, Professor Paul Rice
responded to Professor Carlson by arguing that expert reliance should serve
as a hearsay exception.154 He based his argument on the futility of limiting
instructions, on the proper historical role for the expert as an assistant to—
not replacement for—the factfinder, and on the reliability of the evidence
on which an expert relies. 155
Like Professor Carlson, 156 Professor Rice found the distinction between
using basis evidence for its substance or only to evaluate the expert’s
opinion to be impossible. 157 Allowing the expert to tell the jury what
inadmissible evidence he has relied on, and then telling the jury to use the
information only in evaluating the expert’s opinion—without accepting the
evidence as true—requires “mental gymnastics” that jurors probably cannot
perform. 158 It is “schizophrenic and illogical.” 159

148. Carlson, supra note 142, at 584.
149. Carlson, supra note 144, at 486 & n.34.
150. Carlson, supra note 144, at 484 (arguing that inadmissible basis evidence should not
be admissible for the purposes of evaluating expert testimony); Carlson, supra note 145, at
1183.
151. Carlson, supra note 144, at 484.
152. Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on
Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234, 245 n.44 (1984).
153. Id.
154. Rice, supra note 129, at 586.
155. Id. at 585–86.
156. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
157. Rice, supra note 129, at 584. Rice interpreted Carlson’s position as supporting the
use of otherwise inadmissible basis evidence for the limited purpose of evaluating the
expert’s opinion. Id. (“If this practice sounds like judicial double talk, it is. Professor
Carlson, however, supports this result . . . .”). Carlson later rejected this characterization.
Carlson, supra note 145, at 1183 (“This is not correct. I have consistently opposed the
introduction of otherwise inadmissible background information whether offered directly or
in the guise of justifying the expert’s opinion.”).
158. Rice, supra note 129, at 585; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 586; see also supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
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From this position, Professor Rice took the opposite approach from
Professor Carlson. According to Rice, instead of hiding basis evidence
from the jury unless it is independently admissible, the basis evidence
should be disclosed to the jury in view of the proper role of the expert and
the reliability of expert basis evidence. 160 Rice argued that the proper role
of the expert is to assist the jury. 161 He pointed to the common law practice
of presenting all of the case-specific evidence underlying the expert’s
opinion to the jury, to allow the jury to accept or reject the opinion
accordingly. 162 According to Rice, preventing the jury from hearing and
evaluating the facts underlying the expert’s opinion transforms the expert
from an assistant to the factfinder into a “super-factfinder capable of
producing admissible substantive evidence (an opinion) from inadmissible
evidence.” 163
To allow the jury to consider otherwise inadmissible basis evidence for
its substance, Rule 703 must function as an exception to other exclusionary
rules. Professor Rice would have created a hearsay exception.164 He
suggested adding a new hearsay exception, Rule 803(5):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
...
(5) Statement Employed in Expert Testimony. A statement employed
by an expert in arriving at a conclusion offered by that expert at trial, to
the extent that (a) the statement is of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in a particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, and (b) the expert has demonstrated to [the] presiding judge a
basis for concluding that the statement possesses substantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. 165

Rice also proposed amending Rule 703 to make compliance with his
proposed hearsay exception a prerequisite for expert reliance on
inadmissible information.166 Rice would further have prohibited expert
reliance on evidence that was inadmissible for reasons “other than
reliability,” if disclosure would frustrate the policies of the rule excluding
the evidence. 167
Rice’s disagreement with Carlson could be characterized as choosing a
model that favors education of the jury over deference to an expert’s

160. Rice, supra note 129, at 585–86.
161. Id. at 586–87.
162. Id. at 587; see supra notes 45–46, 59–62 and accompanying text.
163. Rice, supra note 129, at 586–87.
164. Id. at 587. Rice’s argument focuses on hearsay, but inadmissible basis evidence
under Rule 703 is not limited to hearsay. See supra Part I.B.1.
165. Paul R. Rice, The Allure of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires
More Than Redefining “Facts or Data,” 47 MERCER L. REV. 495, 506 (1996) (emphasis
omitted).
166. Id. at 505 (describing a proposed Rule 703 that would require compliance with his
proposed Rule 803(5) for information for which admissible proof was unavailable).
167. Id.
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determination. 168 If the expert does not at least disclose the important basis
evidence underlying his opinion, the jury cannot “be[] informed and then
convinced.” 169 Instead, the jury must defer to the expert.170 On the other
hand, if the court allows the expert to disclose both her specialized
knowledge and the reasons for her opinion in the specific case, the jury can
more fully consider the expert’s opinion and reasoning. 171 However,
allowing the expert to disclose inadmissible evidence to the jury may
simply change where deference is required 172: instead of requiring the jury
to defer to the expert’s opinion divorced from at least some of its basis,
Rice’s position requires the jury to defer to the expert’s selection of the
evidence and evaluation of its evidence. 173 In the context of hearsay,
Rice’s position would substitute the expert for the jury in evaluating
hearsay statements. 174
Rice saw little problem in allowing expert testimony to function as a
hearsay exception. According to Rice, if an expert relies on information of
a type that experts in the field typically rely on as required by Rule 703, 175
the expert has the expertise necessary to determine whether the evidence is
reliable. 176 Hearsay reasonably relied on by an expert is thus sufficiently
reliable to be considered by the jury, 177 which justified the hearsay
Rice also rejected Carlson’s Confrontation Clause
exception. 178
concerns. 179 Rice’s position, however, was based on earlier Supreme Court
Confrontation Clause precedent, which focused on the reliability of the
hearsay evidence in determining whether a confrontation was required. 180
c. The Middle Course
A compromise approach, put forward in an article by Professor JoAnne
Epps, rejected both Professor Carlson’s restrictive approach and Professor
Rice’s open approach. 181 According to Professor Epps, if an expert
reasonably relies on inadmissible facts or data in accordance with Rule 703,
168. Allen & Miller, supra note 10, at 1134–38.
169. Id. at 1136.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1136–37.
172. See Seaman, supra note 31, at 860 (arguing that allowing the jury to rely on the
expert’s evaluation of the basis evidence is no different from allowing the jury to rely on the
expert’s opinion divorced from any support).
173. See id. at 859–60.
174. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
175. FED. R. EVID. 703.
176. Rice, supra note 129, at 588.
177. Id. Rice emphasized that the expert must reasonably rely on the information.
Uncritical reliance would not suffice. Id. at 588–89.
178. Id. at 587–88 (arguing that the reasonable reliance standard of Rule 703 “satisfies the
traditional test for exceptions to the hearsay rule: that the circumstances of the out-of-court
utterance adequately assure reliability in terms of both the accuracy of the declarant’s
perception and memory and the sincerity with which the declarant recited what he perceived
and remembered”).
179. Id. at 595.
180. Id. at 594–95; see infra notes 286–96 and accompanying text.
181. See Epps, supra note 48, at 70–74.
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that inadmissible information should be disclosed to the jury, but only for
the purpose of explaining and supporting the expert’s opinion.182 Professor
Epps suggested two tiers of such information. In the upper tier,
“[i]nformation essential to the opinion should be presented to the jury,
subject to Rule 403.” 183 In the lower tier, information that the expert used
but did not “need” should be subjected to a balancing test in which “the
importance of the evidence to the jury [is balanced] against the likelihood
that the jury will be improperly influenced by the evidence.”184 In fact, the
upper tier may just represent a specific application of the lower tier.185 If
the information is essential to the jury, it presumably passes Epps’s
balancing test for less valuable information.186
Professor Epps reasoned that if an expert relies on a fact in forming an
opinion, that fact ought to be disclosed to the jury, which is charged with
evaluating the opinion.187 The proponent of the expert should be able to
paint a complete picture of the formation of the expert’s opinion, including
both the admissible and inadmissible information upon which the expert
relied. 188 As long as the expert did in fact reasonably rely on the
inadmissible information, a limiting instruction is given, and disclosure
would not be too prejudicial, disclosure serves values of “truth-telling” and
“fairness to the proponent.” 189
Thus, like Professor Rice, 190 Professor Epps emphasized that the expert
must have reasonably relied on the information to be disclosed to the
jury. 191 She advocated an active role for the trial judge in assessing the
reasonableness of expert reliance on particular data.192 According to Epps,
the assessment should go beyond assessing reliability or whether experts in
the field regularly rely on a certain type of data, because regular practice in
a field might be insufficiently rigorous, to assessing the reasonableness of
reliance on information in the particular case.193

182. Id. at 60. Unlike Professor Carlson, see supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text,
and Professor Rice, see supra notes 129–30, 157–59 and accompanying text, Professor Epps
did not express strong concerns about the use of limiting instructions, see Epps, supra note
48, at 72–73.
183. Epps, supra note 48, at 84; see supra note 24 (reproducing the text of Rule 403).
184. Epps, supra note 48, at 84. Epps suggested “unfair prejudice, confusion, and the
inability to distinguish the limited value of the evidence” as examples of “improper[]
influence[].” Id. at 84 & n.134.
185. Cf. id. at 84.
186. Cf. id.
187. Id. at 70–71, 84.
188. Id. at 71.
189. Id. Epps also argued that the language of Rule 705 “would have been nonsensical
unless it contemplated the routine disclosure of otherwise inadmissible facts or data
underlying the expert’s opinion.” Id. And she argued that that the broadening policy of Rule
703, see supra Part I.A.2, and the general policy favoring admissibility of evidence under the
Federal Rules, supported disclosure, see Epps, supra note 48, at 71–72.
190. See supra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
191. Epps, supra note 48, at 74–84.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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4. The Application of Pre-amendment Rule 703 in the Courts
The application of Rule 703 in the courts varied, but across a narrower
range than the varying approaches advocated by commentators. The
restrictive approach advocated by Professor Carlson was not widely
adopted. 194 In addition, no court is recognized as having held that Rule 703
created a hearsay exception (or an exception to the other rules of
evidence). 195
Courts did, however, appear to disagree on the necessity of a limiting
instruction. 196 According to the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 0.59
Acres of Land, 197 when an expert disclosed inadmissible basis evidence to
the jury, the court was required to instruct the jury that the evidence could
only be used to evaluate the expert’s opinion, and not for the truth. 198 The
district court had admitted an expert appraiser’s report with several
inadmissible attachments.199 The Ninth Circuit held that the attachments
would not have been admissible even with a limiting instruction, but
explained that a limiting instruction is necessary “[w]hen inadmissible
evidence . . . is admitted to illustrate and explain the expert’s opinion.”200
On the other hand, in United States v. Rollins, 201 the Seventh Circuit did not
object to an expert’s disclosure of hearsay to the jury. 202 In Rollins, an FBI
agent testified as an expert to provide his opinion on the meaning of code
words used in taped telephone conversations between one of the defendants
and a government informant. 203 The agent testified that the informant told
him that the code word “t-shirts” referred to cocaine. 204 The Seventh
Circuit upheld the admission of the expert’s testimony. 205 The court did
not address the issue of limiting instructions, and did not explicitly adopt
Professor Rice’s approach of using Rule 703 as a hearsay exception.206
194. Id. at 63–64.
195. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 229 (3d ed. 1998) (“It does not appear that any reported case has
expressly recognized Rule 703 as creating an exception to the hearsay rule . . . .”); Epps,
supra note 48, at 64 (“Not surprisingly, no located case makes this ruling explicitly.”); Rice,
supra note 165, at 500 (“Professor Imwinkelried, again quoting Professor Epps, noted that
not a single case has adopted the Rice view. Sadly, I must acknowledge that this is true.”).
196. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment.
197. 109 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1997).
198. Id. at 1496; see FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment
(describing 0.59 Acres of Land as holding that it was an “error to admit hearsay offered as
the basis of an expert opinion, without a limiting instruction”).
199. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d at 1495–96.
200. Id. at 1496; see also AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 195, at 229 n.96
(describing 0.59 Acres of Land as “holding [that] it was error to admit hearsay as the basis
for an expert’s opinion without a limiting instruction”).
201. 862 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1988).
202. Id. at 1292–93; see also FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000
amendment (describing Rollins as “admitting, as part of the basis of an FBI agent’s expert
opinion on the meaning of code language, the hearsay statements of an informant”).
203. Rollins, 862 F.2d at 1285, 1291–93.
204. Id. at 1293.
205. See id.
206. See id.
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Nevertheless, the court did seemingly admit the hearsay for substantive use
by the jury. 207
Thus, while no court held that Rule 703 created a hearsay exception (or
an exception to the other rules of evidence), courts, at least on occasion,
allowed experts to disclose otherwise inadmissible basis evidence without a
limiting instruction.208 A court that did allow an expert to disclose
inadmissible basis evidence without requiring a limiting instruction
effectively admitted the evidence for its substance.209 In addition, even if
courts did not treat Rule 703 as a hearsay exception, considerable debate
surrounded the proper application of Rule 703 and the effectiveness of
limiting instructions under the Rule. 210 In 2000, the Rule was amended to
address these concerns.
C. The 2000 Amendment to Rule 703
In 2000, Rule 703 was amended to clarify that it did not function as a
hearsay exception, and to create a presumption against disclosing
inadmissible basis evidence. The amendment added a third sentence to the
Rule, which now provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for
the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 211

Taken as a whole, Rule 703 permits an expert to disclose inadmissible
basis evidence to the jury if two requirements are satisfied. First, the expert
must have permissibly relied on the inadmissible information. That is, the
inadmissible information must be “of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject.” 212 Second, the court must—if the opponent of the expert objects
to the disclosure—determine that the probative value of the information in
207. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 195, at 229 n.96 (describing
Rollins as “admitting, apparently for substantive use, the statements of an informant as part
of the basis for the expert opinion testimony of an F.B.I. agent on the meaning of code
language”).
208. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting (Apr. 14–15,
1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ev497.htm (“[T]he Reporter was instructed . . . to report on whether [Rule 703] was being used
as a ‘back-door’ hearsay exception. The Reporter’s responsive memorandum concluded that
there were some cases in which hearsay had been offered as the basis of an expert’s opinion,
but without a limiting instruction.”).
209. See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part I.B.3.
211. FED. R. EVID. 703.
212. Id.
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assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. 213
Courts take two approaches to the first requirement. 214 Under one
approach, the trial judge undertakes an independent investigation to
determine reasonable reliance as a preliminary matter under Rule 104(a).215
Under the other approach, the trial judge pays more deference to the expert
role, and merely confirms that the expert has relied on information upon
which other experts in the field rely. 216 The requirement of reasonable
reliance must be passed for the expert to rely on the inadmissible evidence
at all, even if the expert does not disclose it. If the court determines that the
expert has relied on information that a reasonable expert would not, the
opinion may be excluded. 217
The second requirement, which reverses Rule 403’s presumption of
admissibility, creates a presumption against disclosing the information to
the jury. 218 The prejudicial effect that the court must consider should
include the likelihood that the jury will be able to follow a limiting
instruction. 219
Notably, Rule 703 does not prevent the opponent of an expert from fully
exploring the basis of the expert’s testimony on cross-examination.220
Indeed, Rule 705 provides that “[t]he expert may . . . be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” 221 If the expert’s basis
evidence has flaws, it may be unfair to the proponent to prevent the expert
from disclosing and explaining the basis evidence during the expert’s direct
testimony, leaving the opponent to catch the expert in a “gotcha” moment
213. FED. R. EVID. 703; id. advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment (“The
information may be disclosed to the jury, upon objection, only if the trial court finds that the
probative value of the information in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”).
214. 1 PAUL G. GIANNELLI & EDWARD L. IMWINKELRIED, JR., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
§ 5.05[c], at 312–13 (4th ed. 2007).
215. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We now make
clear that it is the judge who makes the determination of reasonable reliance . . . .”); see also
KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6.1.b (“The dominant view is that courts have an
independent obligation to assess the reasonableness of an expert’s reliance on a type of
factual data.”). Rule 104(a) provides that the court determines “[p]reliminary questions
concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
216. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.6.1.b (describing a “minority view” in which
courts only examine whether experts typically rely on similar information); Blinka, supra
note 134, at 51–52 (arguing that courts are reluctant to “second-guess” experts on the issue
of reasonable reliance); Epps, supra note 48, at 76 (describing a “liberal approach,”
according to which courts may not independently evaluate reasonable reliance).
217. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 697 (3d Cir. 1999) (“If the data underlying the
expert’s opinion are so unreliable that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them,
the opinion resting on that data must be excluded.” (citing In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 748)).
218. Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 (permitting disclosure of information if the probative
value in evaluating the expert’s opinion “substantially outweighs” the information’s
prejudicial effect), with FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting exclusion of information if the
probative value “is substantially outweighed by” the prejudicial effect).
219. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment.
220. Id.
221. FED. R. EVID. 705; see FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000
amendment.
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during cross-examination.222 Indeed, calling into question the bases of an
expert’s testimony can be an important way for an opponent to challenge
the expert’s opinion.223
If the opponent does challenge the expert’s basis, the door may be open
for the proponent to respond with basis evidence that could not have been
disclosed earlier.224 In addition, the proponent might want to preemptively
expose the flaws in the basis evidence to “‘remove the sting’ from the
opponent’s anticipated attack.”225 The advisory committee’s note therefore
directs the trial court to consider the proponent’s possible strategic
considerations when conducting the required balancing under Rule 703.226
In view of this direction, a weakness in inadmissible basis evidence may
actually counsel in favor of disclosure.227
The amendment to Rule 703 was intended “to emphasize that when an
expert reasonably relies on inadmissible information to form an opinion or
inference, the underlying information is not admissible simply because the
opinion or inference is admitted.”228 To do so, it created a presumption
against disclosure that reversed the Rule 403 presumption of
admissibility.229 The presumption against disclosure, together with the
probability that limiting instructions could be impossible for a jury to
follow, at least in the context of Rule 703,230 would suggest that disclosure
should be rare. On the other hand, the need for the jury to hear the
underlying evidence to understand the expert’s opinion,231 coupled with the
likelihood that an opponent may explore the evidence anyway,232 counsel
admission. The next part of this Note examines the application of amended
Rule 703 in the courts.
II. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 703 IN THE COURTS
The amendment to Rule 703 addressed the controversy around
inadmissible basis evidence by clarifying that Rule 703 did not serve as a
hearsay exception and by creating a new presumption against disclosure of
222. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
223. See John F. Stoviak & Christina D. Riggs, Preparing for and Cross-Examining the
Opposing Expert at Trial, in LITIGATORS ON EXPERTS: STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING EXPERT
WITNESSES FROM RETENTION THROUGH TRIAL 326, 332–33 (Wendy Gerwick Couture &
Allyson W. Haynes eds., 2010) (describing attacking an expert’s bases as inaccurate or
unsupported, and attacking an expert’s bases as incomplete as two of five suggested ways to
undermine expert testimony).
224. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment (“[A]n
adversary’s attack on an expert’s basis will often open the door to a proponent’s rebuttal
with information that was reasonably relied upon by the expert, even if that information
would not have been discloseable initially under the balancing test provided by this
amendment.”).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Cf. id.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text.
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the inadmissible evidence.233 Nevertheless, as explained in Part II.A, to the
extent that the problem of back door evidence stems from a party inducing
an expert to rely on questionable evidence in the hopes of disclosing such
evidence to the jury, an examination of reasonable reliance acts as a first
barrier to disclosure. 234 If the court determines that the expert has, in fact,
reasonably relied on inadmissible basis evidence, then the balancing test in
the added third sentence of Rule 703 acts as a second barrier to
disclosure. 235 Part II.B reviews federal court opinions considering
disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence during two-year periods before
and after the 2000 amendment. This review shows a tendency toward
disclosure before the amendment, which was curbed by the amendment to
Rule 703. Even after the amendment, however, disclosure still occurs in a
substantial number of cases.
Accordingly, the effectiveness of a limiting instruction becomes
important. If a limiting instruction is ineffective, then the evidence
disclosed in these cases turns into substantive evidence.236 Part II.C
considers a subset of inadmissible basis evidence—evidence that would
violate a criminal defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights if used for
substantive purposes—that demonstrates that in at least one instance, Rule
703’s approach of limited admissibility is not tenable.
A. Back Door Evidence and Reasonable Reliance
To the extent that the problem of back door evidence stems from a party
inducing an expert to rely on questionable evidence in the hopes of
disclosing such evidence to the jury, 237 an examination of reasonable
reliance acts as a first barrier to disclosure. 238 Courts in this context appear
particularly suspicious of experts who rely on data selected for them by the
parties who hire them, instead of conducting some independent
investigation. 239

233. See supra Part I.C.
234. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 213, 218 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
237. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., Nos. C 04-02123, C 04-03327, C 0403732, C 05-03117, 2008 WL 2323856, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2008) (second omnibus
order) (condemning the “abuse[]” of “spoon-feeding . . . client-prepared and lawyerorchestrated” information to experts in the hopes of putting such information before the
jury); Blinka, supra note 101, at 1249–54 (describing the use of Rule 703 to circumvent
other rules and place information before the jury).
238. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.
239. See Therasense, 2008 WL 2323856, at *1; Sinco, Inc. v. U.S. Chicory Inc., No.
8:03CV315, 2005 WL 2180094, at *2–3 (D. Neb. Aug. 10, 2005) (order on motion in
limine) (suggesting that an expert’s testimony on some topics may be inadmissible under
Rules 403 and 703 because the opinions were “based, in large part, on ‘biased information’
provided . . . by the owner of [the] Defendant [corporation]”); Crowley v. Chait, 322
F. Supp. 2d 530, 542–43 (D.N.J. 2004) (order on motions in limine) (barring an expert’s
opinion to the extent that it was based on “preselected deposition testimony” rather than
independent investigation).
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In addition, Rule 703 does not allow experts to serve as conduits for
information upon which they have not actually relied. 240 For example, in
United States v. Mejia, 241 the Second Circuit explained that a gang expert
could rely on hearsay, but could not merely repeat it. 242 In Mejia, the
expert’s testimony contained both acceptable expert opinion obtained from
a “synthesis of various source materials” and unacceptable testimony in
which the expert did not analyze the source material, but “merely repeated
their contents.” 243 As discussed in Part III.B, this distinction between
analysis and repetition does not resolve whether an expert has improperly
transmitted hearsay in violation of Rule 703: an expert can both analyze
inadmissible evidence and repeat its contents to the jury. 244 In Loeffel Steel
Products, Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 245 the court determined that the
defendant’s damages expert had impermissibly calculated the plaintiff’s
loss using information provided by the defendant that the expert was
incapable of evaluating. 246 Along similar lines, in Sterling v. Provident Life
& Accident Insurance Co., 247 the plaintiff attempted to introduce hearsay
through its expert, but the expert admitted that she had no expertise about
the claims to which the hearsay related.248
Finally, if the court determines that the expert has, in fact, reasonably
relied on inadmissible basis evidence, then the balancing test of Rule 703
acts as a second barrier to disclosure.249 This balancing test, added in 2000,
creates a presumption against disclosure of inadmissible evidence even for
evidence upon which an expert has reasonably relied. 250 The test could
serve as an important barrier against inadmissible evidence, but competing
and substantial interests weigh on both sides of the balance.251 The next
section addresses the effect of this balancing in practice.
B. Pre- and Post-amendment Application of Rule 703
This section reviews the application of Rule 703 before and after the
2000 amendment to assess the balancing test added to Rule 703 in 2000.
The review of the pre-amendment Rule examines the years 1997 and 1998
because any problem corrected by the amendment should have been
apparent in these years. The review of amended Rule 703 examines the
years 2007 and 2008 because by that time courts should have become
240. See 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6273
(1997 & Supp. 2011) (explaining that Rule 703 is “simply inapplicable” and does not permit
disclosing inadmissible basis evidence “when . . . the expert adds nothing to the out-of-court
statements other than transmitting them to the jury”).
241. 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008).
242. Id. at 197.
243. Id. at 197–98.
244. See infra Part III.B.
245. 387 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (order on motion in limine).
246. Id. at 807–10.
247. 619 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (order granting partial summary judgment).
248. Id. at 1258–59.
249. See supra notes 213, 218 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 220–32 and accompanying text.
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familiar with the 2000 amendment. The review does not consider decisions
that turned on the first threshold issue described above in Parts I.C and II.A
(whether the expert reasonably relied on the inadmissible basis
evidence). 252 Instead, the review focuses on the 2000 amendment to Rule
703 by considering decisions that address disclosure of the inadmissible
basis evidence where reasonable reliance was established or not at issue. A
measure of subjectivity was involved, of course, in classifying courts’
reasoning, which was not necessarily explicit.
The review suggests that the presumption against disclosure added to
Rule 703 had at least some effect. Before the amendment, a tendency
toward disclosure is apparent, as discussed in Part II.B.1. After the
amendment, the cases are more evenly divided, as discussed in Part II.B.2,
but disclosure still occurs in a substantial number of cases.
1. Pre-amendment Application of Rule 703
In 1997 and 1998, nine surveyed federal court opinions considered
disclosure of inadmissible expert basis evidence under Rule 703. Of these
nine, six permitted disclosure,253 while three prohibited it. 254 Although the
issue was not heavily litigated, this two-to-one ratio suggests a tendency
toward permitting disclosure of the underlying basis evidence.
No clear pattern emerges from the cases. Some allowed disclosure of
seemingly minor evidence, but others permitted disclosure of apparently
252. See supra Part II.A; notes 212, 214–17 and accompanying text.
253. Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 274–75 (5th Cir. 1998)
(upholding disclosure that the opponent of the expert did not object to, on plain error
review); Garner ex rel. Walden v. Howe, 105 F.3d 647, No. 95-2492, 1997 WL 9764, at *3–
5 (4th Cir. Jan. 13 1997) (unpublished table decision) (upholding a trial court’s decision to
allow an expert to discuss an article upon which he had relied); In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust
Litig., Nos. 96-2338, 96-1131, 96-2003, 96-2111, 95-2104, 1998 WL 1031508, at *1 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 20, 1998) (memorandum explaining evidentiary ruling) (explaining that disclosure
of fewer than ten objected-to documents that were not the focus of the expert’s opinion did
not present a problem under Rule 703); Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, No. CIV974014, 1998 WL 2017925, at *1, 3–4 (D.S.D. Sept. 17, 1998) (order denying defendant’s
motion for new trial) (approving the testimony of a “vocational rehabilitation specialist” who
testified that records he reviewed indicated that the plaintiff had a “partial impairment of
eleven percent”); Kinser v. Gehl Co., No. Civ.A. 96-2361, 1998 WL 231065, at *4 (D. Kan.
Apr. 21, 1998) (order denying defendant’s motions for judgment as a matter of law or new
trial) (permitting disclosure of the contents of documents relied on by experts); United States
v. Morris, No. Crim. A. 94-00046-C, 1997 WL 17649, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 13, 1997)
(reasoning that Rule 703 permits experts to introduce inadmissible information, which in this
case included hearsay statements by gang members).
254. United States v. Quintanilla, 165 F.3d 920, Nos. 97-10339, 97-10540, 98-10091,
1998 WL 895360, at *5–6 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (finding no reversible
error in a district court decision preventing defendant’s expert on battered women’s
syndrome from discussing the bases of his opinion, because the jury could not have relied on
the evidence for its substance to establish the events relied on in any event); Arkwright Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir. 1997) (approving a district
court’s decision to admit an opinion that relied on another expert’s report and to exclude the
substance of the other expert’s report); United States v. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d 1493,
1496–97 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the challenged basis evidence was “not of the kind that
might be admitted in connection with the expert’s testimony, regardless of the presence of a
limiting instruction”).
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significant evidence. A trial judge in one case explained that the disclosure
of a small number of documents did not present a problem, when the
documents did not play a central role in the expert’s opinion and the court
gave the jury a limiting instruction to explain that the documents could not
be considered for the truth of what they contained. 255
On the other hand, in Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, a
“vocational rehabilitation specialist” testified for the plaintiff.256 Over the
defendant’s objection, the court allowed the specialist to testify that he had
reviewed the plaintiff’s medical history, and that two doctors had
determined that the plaintiff suffered from “a permanent partial impairment
of eleven percent of the whole body.” 257 The Eighth Circuit later upheld
the trial court’s approach.258 The court rejected the defendant’s argument
that the plaintiff had been improperly allowed to present the testimony of
medical experts through the testimony of its vocational specialist.259 In
Brennan, the plaintiff appears to have succeeded in a tactic that Professor
Carlson warned against—presenting the testimony of an expert who
discloses the opinions of multiple other experts, effectively presenting the
testimony of several experts to the jury, while having to produce (and
subject to cross-examination) only one of them. 260
2. Application of Amended Rule 703
In 2007 and 2008, fourteen surveyed federal court opinions considered
disclosure of inadmissible expert basis evidence under Rule 703. Of these
fourteen, seven permitted disclosure, 261 while seven prohibited it.262
255. In re Indus. Silicon Antitrust Litig., 1998 WL 1031508, at *1.
256. Brennan, 1998 WL 2017925, at *1.
257. Id. at *3 (quoting the testimony of the specialist).
258. Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, 211 F.3d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 2000).
259. Id. at 450, 452.
260. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. In contrast to Brennan, a different case
in the surveyed period recognized the problem of allowing one expert to introduce another
expert’s opinion. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc., 125 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th
Cir. 1997) (approving a district court’s decision to admit an opinion that relied in part on
another expert’s report, and to exclude the substance of the other expert’s report).
261. United States v. Wolling, 223 F. App’x 610, 612–13 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding a
district court’s decision to permit defense experts to describe the contents of medical records
that were excluded under Rule 403, and to refuse the jury’s request to view the records
themselves); United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Aon Ltd., Civ. No. 04-539, 2008 WL 3819865, at *14–
15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2008) (orders on motions in limine) (permitting an expert to disclose
the contents of hearsay English court decisions, but “anticipat[ing]” that the jury would be
prevented from receiving the decisions in the jury room); Betts v. Gen. Motors Corp., No.
3:04cv169-M-A, 2008 WL 2789524, at *10 (N.D. Miss. July 16, 2008) (order on motions in
limine and for summary judgment) (citing Rule 703 as permitting an expert to testify about
documents not admissible in evidence); Galloway v. Big G Express, Inc, No. 3:05-CV-545,
2008 WL 2704443, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. July 3, 2008) (order on motions in limine) (permitting
an expert to discuss inadmissible basis evidence for limited purposes, and indicating that a
limiting instruction would be issued); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods.
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, Civil Nos. 06-25, 05-2596, 2007 WL 1964337, at *3–4, 6
(D. Minn. June 29, 2007) (order on motions in limine) (permitting experts to testify based on
certain underlying data, and raising the possibility of issuing a limiting instruction “to meet
the Rule 703 balancing test”); Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 470
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Again, no clear pattern emerges from the cases.263 Given the factdependent nature of the balancing test under Rule 703 264 and the varying
facts of the cases, however, a clear pattern would be unexpected.
Considering the cases from 2007 and 2008 in the aggregate, the breakdown
of seven decisions permitting disclosure and seven prohibiting disclosure
suggests that the amendment to Rule 703 at least reduced a tendency toward
disclosure that existed before 2000. 265 Still, while amended Rule 703 may
have curbed a pre-2000 tendency toward disclosure, half of the reviewed
decisions permitted disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence.266 As a
result, the debate over the proper treatment of inadmissible basis evidence
retains significance.267
One of the reviewed cases from 2007, United States v. Wolling, 268
illustrates a jury confronting the proper way to evaluate basis evidence
underlying expert opinion testimony. The defendant in Wolling presented
the expert testimony of a doctor in support of his diminished capacity
defense. 269 The expert testified that he relied on medical records relating to
a psychologist’s prior evaluation of the defendant.270 The court excluded
the medical records under Rule 403.271 Nevertheless, the expert, apparently
F. Supp. 2d 435, 443 (D. Del. 2007) (order on motion in limine) (reasoning that the
probative value of the expert basis evidence substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect
under the balancing test of Rule 703); In re Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 596–97 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
2007) (finding an otherwise inadmissible report admissible to explain the expert’s opinion,
but not for substantive use).
262. Wiles v. Dep’t of Educ., Civ. Nos. 04-00442, 05-00247, 2008 WL 6808428, at *2
(D. Haw. Oct. 7, 2008) (order on motion in limine) (holding that for statements underlying
an expert opinion to be admitted, the proponent would be required to demonstrate that the
statements were not hearsay or fell under a hearsay exception); Rideout v. Nguyen, No.
4:05CV-00001, 2008 WL 3850390, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 15, 2008) (order on motions in
limine) (permitting expert reliance on, but not disclosure of, apparently inadmissible
evidence); Peters v. Nissan Forklift Corp. N. Am., No. 06-2880, 2008 WL 2625522, at *2–3
(E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2008) (order on motion in limine) (prohibiting disclosure of inadmissible
documents of similar accidents in a product liability action); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v.
Rambus Inc., Nos. CV-00-20905, C-05-00334, C-06-00244, 2008 WL 282376, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2008) (order on motions in limine) (ruling that a prior Federal Circuit decision
from a different litigation could not be disclosed under Rule 703); McDevitt v. Guenther,
522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1294 (D. Haw. 2007) (orders on motions for summary judgment and
motion in limine) (prohibiting an expert from reciting otherwise inadmissible facts under
Rule 703); Weiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 512 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D. La. 2007) (order on
objections to exhibits, motions in limine, and motions to quash) (permitting an expert to rely
on an inadmissible report, and appearing to permit only general reference to the report
itself); Garcia v. Los Banos Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:04-CV-6059, 2007 WL 715526, at *1–
2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (order on motions in limine) (preventing disclosure of hearsay
statements of the plaintiff from the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, after weighing the
probative value and prejudicial effect of disclosure).
263. See supra Part II.B.1.
264. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 703; id. advisory committee’s note on 2000 amendment.
265. See supra Part II.B.1.
266. See supra notes 261–62.
267. See supra Part I.B.
268. 223 F. App’x 610 (9th Cir. 2007).
269. Id. at 612.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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without objection from the prosecution, informed the jury of the medical
diagnoses in the medical records. 272 During deliberations, the jury asked to
review the medical records upon which the expert had relied.273 The judge
refused, and explained that the expert had described the medical records
only to support his opinions. 274
The jury in Wolling, in evaluating the expert’s opinion, sought to more
closely evaluate the basis evidence underlying the opinion.275 Indeed, it
may be impossible to accept or reject an expert’s opinion without accepting
or rejecting the underlying data. 276 In Wolling, the judge’s limiting
instruction and refusal to provide the records to the jury counteracted the
jury’s desire to scrutinize information that the judge had already found to be
substantially more prejudicial than probative. 277
Even if the amendment to Rule 703 has reduced the frequency of
disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence, disclosure continues to occur.278
Indeed, in some cases it may not be possible for the jury to meaningfully
evaluate an expert’s opinion without hearing the underlying evidence.279
The resulting disclosure, however necessary, can place prejudicial
information before the jury. In United States v. Leeson, 280 the defendant
challenged the disclosure of basis evidence by a psychologist who testified
as an expert for the government. 281 The district court allowed the
psychologist to testify that he relied on statements from two of the
defendant’s fellow inmates, who had not spoken to the testifying expert, but
rather to a different psychologist.282 According to the testifying expert, the
two inmates reported that the defendant had requested help in “looking
crazy.” 283 The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had correctly
allowed disclosure of the inmates’ statements, in view of the high relevance
of the statements for the purpose of evaluating the psychologist’s
opinion. 284
Even after the amendment to Rule 703, then, disclosure of inadmissible
basis evidence can be expected in a significant number of cases because of
the jury’s need to hear the evidence to evaluate the expert’s opinion. If a
limiting instruction is ineffective, then the evidence disclosed in these cases
272. Id.
273. Id. at 613.
274. Id.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 270–73.
276. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
277. See supra text accompanying note 274.
278. See supra Part II.B.2.
279. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99-MDL-1317, 2005 WL
5955699, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2005) (order on motions in limine) (reasoning that the jury
would be unable to evaluate expert opinions without disclosure of the basis evidence);
Hambrick v. Ken-Bar Mfg. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 627, 639 (W.D. Va. 2002) (order denying
motion for summary judgment) (explaining that a “survey’s probative value is essential for
understanding and evaluating” the expert opinion).
280. 453 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2006).
281. Id. at 636–38.
282. Id. at 634–35.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 637–38.
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turns into substantive evidence, 285 despite Rule 703’s intent that such
evidence be used only for the limited purpose of evaluating the expert’s
testimony. The next section discusses the disclosure of inadmissible basis
evidence that would violate the Confrontation Clause if used substantively.
This subset of inadmissible basis evidence demonstrates that in at least one
area, Rule 703’s approach of limited admissibility is not tenable.
C. Expert Reliance on Testimonial Hearsay
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” 286 In its 2004 decision in Crawford v.
Washington, 287 the Supreme Court altered its approach to hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause. Under the Court’s 1980 decision in Ohio v.
Roberts, 288 the Confrontation Clause permitted the prosecution to use an
unavailable witness’s statement against the defendant if the statement
possessed sufficient “indicia of reliability.” 289 The test was satisfied if the
statement fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or when it
possessed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 290 In Crawford,
the Court rejected this reliability-based approach. 291 In its place, the Court
adopted a test focusing on whether the hearsay was “testimonial.”292 If a
statement is testimonial, the Confrontation Clause permits its introduction
against the defendant only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant
has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.293 According to the
Court in Crawford, confrontation is the only constitutionally acceptable
method of assuring the reliability of such statements. 294
The Court did not provide detailed guidance to explain what hearsay can
be considered testimonial. 295 The Court’s guidelines did indicate that
testimonial generally includes statements that resemble testimony at trial,
such as statements made before a grand jury, as well as statements made
under circumstances that suggest they would be used in prosecution, such
as statements made in a police interrogation.296
285. See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
286. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
287. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
288. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
289. Id. at 66; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
290. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
291. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–68.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 68.
294. Id. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 51–52, 68; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation
Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 792 (2007). The Court later
clarified that statements made to police for the “primary purpose” of resolving an ongoing
emergency are not testimonial. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). On the
other hand, statements made for the “primary purpose” of proving past events, rather than
resolving an emergency, are testimonial. Id. As explained by the Court in Michigan v.
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After Crawford, the Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts297
that “certificates of analysis,” which indicated that a forensic analysis
showed a substance to be cocaine, were testimonial. 298 And most recently,
in Bullcoming v. New Mexico,299 the Court held that the defendant in a
drunk-driving prosecution had a right to be confronted with the actual
scientific analyst who tested the defendant’s blood to produce a blood
alcohol report (which was testimonial evidence). 300 A different analyst
who “had neither participated in nor observed the test” could not
constitutionally serve as a substitute.301
1. The Intersection of Crawford and Disclosure of Basis Evidence
Much information that an expert might rely on is nontestimonial.302 But
experts can also rely on testimonial statements that would be hearsay if
offered for their truth. 303 For example, a gang expert might rely on
information obtained from police interrogations performed while
investigating the defendant, or a psychologist might interview the family of
a defendant in preparing to oppose a defendant’s insanity defense. 304 In
addition, one forensic expert might offer an opinion based on a testimonial
report prepared by a different expert.
Perhaps significantly, the Court in Bullcoming noted that the substitute
analyst did not offer an “independent opinion” on the blood alcohol
report. 305 Justice Sotomayor, one of five votes for the holding, discussed
this point somewhat further, in “emphasiz[ing] the limited reach” of the
opinion. 306 Justice Sotomayor pointed out that Bullcoming did not involve
an expert witness “asked for his independent opinion about underlying
testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence.”307 In
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155, 1157 & n.9 (2011), a statement can be nontestimonial in the
absence of an ongoing emergency. In making this point, the Court may have walked back
from Crawford toward the reliability standard of Roberts. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155, 1157 &
n.9 (“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed to
identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”); see also Colin Miller, Michigan v.
Bryant, Part 6, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG (Mar. 3, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
evidenceprof/2011/03/yesterday-i-posted-an-entryaboutjustice-scalia-accusing-the-majorityin-michigan-v-bryantofretreating-fromcrawford-v-washi.html (“Thus, it seems to me that the
majority in Michigan v. Bryant is using the Ohio v. Roberts ‘adequate indicia or reliability’
test to determine whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial.”).
297. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
298. Id. at 2530–32.
299. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
300. Id. at 2709–11, 2715–17.
301. Id. at 2709, 2715–16.
302. See id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part) (describing statements made for
medical treatment as nontestimonial); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 n.9 (2011);
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539–40 (“Business and public records are generally
admissible absent confrontation . . . because . . . they are not testimonial.”).
303. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 801–09.
304. See id. at 808; see also United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Melendez-Diaz did not do away with Federal Rule of Evidence 703.”).
305. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715–16 (majority opinion).
306. Id. at 2719, 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
307. Id. at 2722.

2011]

THE APPLICATION OF AMENDED FRE 703

993

doing so, she pointed out that Rule 703 allows experts to base opinions on
inadmissible evidence. 308 According to Justice Sotomayor, the court
“would face a different question if asked to determine the constitutionality
of allowing an expert witness to discuss others’ testimonial statements if the
testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.” 309 This
reasoning parallels that used by lower federal courts in considering expert
witness testimony based on possibly testimonial statements, as discussed in
Part II.C.2.
In a footnote in Crawford, the Court parenthetically remarked that the
Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”310 Taken
at face value, this statement would permit an expert to rely on and disclose
testimonial hearsay for the purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion,
because that purpose is “other than [for] establishing the truth of the matter
asserted.” 311 That is, if the expert discloses a testimonial statement only for
the purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion, then the statement has not
been offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, the statement is
not testimonial hearsay, 312 and the Confrontation Clause does not apply.313
This rationale is widespread in the courts. 314 The New York Court of
Appeals, however, has rejected this reasoning, as explained in the next
section.
2. People v. Goldstein
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the non-hearsay explanation for
expert basis evidence in People v. Goldstein.315 Goldstein reversed the
conviction of a mentally ill man for killing a stranger by throwing her in
front of a subway train. 316 Expert psychiatrists testified for the prosecution

308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471
U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). But see James L. Kainen & Carrie A. Tendler, The Case for a
Constitutional Definition of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation of Testimonial, Nonassertive
Conduct and Statements Admitted to Explain an Unchallenged Investigation, 93 MARQ. L.
REV. 1415, 1449–72 (2010) (arguing that admitting a testimonial statement for the nominally
not-for-the-truth purpose of explaining an investigator’s action, when the defendant has not
challenged the action, should be understood as a Confrontation Clause violation); Stephen
Aslett, Comment, Crawford’s Curious Dictum: Why Testimonial “Nonhearsay” Implicates
the Confrontation Clause, 82 TUL. L. REV. 297, 338 (2007) (arguing that the statement in
footnote nine of Crawford conflicts with the framers’ understanding of hearsay).
311. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Street, 471 U.S. at 414); see supra notes 90–94
and accompanying text.
312. To be hearsay, the statement must be offered “to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
313. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 811–29 (explaining and criticizing this argument);
see also supra note 310 and accompanying text.
314. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.10.1; Seaman, supra note 31, at 846 n.93
(collecting cases).
315. 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–34 (N.Y. 2005).
316. Id. at 728–29.
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and defense. 317 The prosecution’s expert argued that the defendant’s illness
was “relatively mild,” and that he used his illness as an excuse for violent,
The trial court permitted the
predatory acts against women. 318
prosecution’s expert to repeat what six people told her about the
defendant. 319 The Court of Appeals, focusing on four of the six declarants,
determined that their out of court statements were testimonial under
Crawford. 320 The prosecution made the argument described above, that the
statements had only been offered to evaluate the expert’s opinion, not for
their truth. 321
The court rejected the argument, reasoning that the jury could not have
used the statements to evaluate the expert’s opinion without accepting the
statements as true or false. 322 The prosecution, the court pointed out,
wanted the jury to accept the statements as true and to accept the opinion
based on them. 323 The statements had been offered for their truth, and were
therefore testimonial hearsay under Crawford. 324
As Professor Jennifer Mnookin explains, the Goldstein court recognized
that the purpose for which the prosecution offered the statements required
the jury to assess the reliability of the speakers. 325 The statements were
actually offered for a hearsay purpose. 326 Thus, while it might have been
acceptable for the expert to refer to her sources in general terms, it violated
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights to allow the expert to repeat the
hearsay statements of her sources. 327
Even if only a general reference is allowed, however, expert reliance on
testimonial hearsay raises an additional question: what if the defendant
attacks the basis of the expert’s opinion? Under the approach to Rules 703
and 705 suggested by the advisory committee’s notes, if the opponent
challenges the expert’s basis, the door may be open for the proponent to
respond with basis evidence that could not have been disclosed earlier.328

317. Id. at 729.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 733–34.
321. Id. at 732; see supra Part II.C.1.
322. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d at 732.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 733; see Mnookin, supra note 296, at 824–26 (characterizing the Goldstein
analysis as “spot on: courts should not be able to avoid analysis of the Crawford issues
present when prosecution experts disclose the substance of their sources on direct
examination, through the fictional claim that such statements are offered for a purpose other
than their truth”).
325. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 826.
326. Id.; cf. Kainen & Tendler, supra note 310, at 1449–72 (explaining that when a court
admits a testimonial statement to explain the action of an investigator even though the
defendant has not challenged the action, the statement lacks any permissible nonhearsay use
(such as rebutting a defendant’s challenge to an investigator’s action)).
327. See Mnookin, supra note 296, at 826–27 (suggesting that referring to the general
nature of an expert’s sources, instead of the detailed substance of the information they
provided, is more supportable under Crawford).
328. See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text.
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Whether this approach should apply to testimonial hearsay remains
unsettled. 329
3. Testimonial Hearsay and Expert Testimony in Federal Courts
Federal courts have not yet adopted Goldstein’s reasoning, though
concern exists about transmitting testimonial hearsay through experts.
Thus, for example, the Second Circuit reasoned in United States v.
Lombardozzi, 330 that an expert could rely on testimonial statements, but
could not communicate them or directly convey their substance to the
jury. 331 In another Second Circuit case, United States v. Mejia, 332 the court
held that the government’s expert had reasonably relied on various hearsay
statements, but warned against allowing the expert to transmit hearsay to
the jury. 333 In Mejia, the expert repeated information without analysis in a
way that suggested to the court that he was summarizing the evidence, and
not acting as an expert.334
As phrased by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Johnson, 335 expert
reliance on testimonial hearsay is problematic “only” if the expert “is used
as little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial hearsay, rather
than as a true expert whose considered opinion sheds light on some
specialized factual situation.” 336 The experts in Johnson did not refer to the
contents of any testimonial statements, however, and the admission of their
testimony was therefore upheld. 337 The Fourth Circuit made similar
arguments in upholding the admission of expert testimony in United States
v. Ayala. 338 Quoting Johnson, the Ayala court explained that “the question
when applying Crawford to expert testimony is ‘whether the expert is, in
essence, giving an independent judgment or merely acting as a transmitter
for testimonial hearsay.’” 339
These cases recognize that the government violates the defendant’s
Confrontation Clause rights when it uses an expert as a conduit for
testimonial hearsay. Unlike Goldstein, 340 these cases do not relate to a
situation in which the testimonial hearsay was communicated to the jury in
addition to the expert’s opinion. Instead, Johnson and Ayala in particular
329. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 12, § 4.10.4.
330. 491 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007).
331. Id. at 72–73. In Lombardozzi, the court suggested that a small portion of the expert’s
testimony might have been excludable on Confrontation Clause grounds because the only
source for the expert’s information was testimonial evidence, but the error did not require
reversal. Id.
332. 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008).
333. Id. at 197–98.
334. Id. at 197–99; see also United States v. Rubi-Gonzalez, 311 F. App’x 483, 487–88
(2d Cir. 2009) (excluding the testimony of the same expert who testified in Mejia, for
essentially the same reasons).
335. 587 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2009).
336. Id. at 635.
337. Id. at 636.
338. 601 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2010).
339. Id. at 275 (quoting Johnson, 587 F.3d at 635).
340. See supra Part II.C.2.
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suggest a dichotomy between transmitting hearsay and providing an expert
opinion. 341 As discussed above, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Bullcoming also suggests that an “independent” expert opinion might avoid
Confrontation Clause problems. 342
However, the “independent opinion” distinction does not resolve the
problem of expert reliance on testimonial hearsay. As Goldstein and Rule
703 demonstrate, an expert can both provide an opinion and transmit
hearsay to the jury in support of the opinion.343 Part III.B returns to this
point.
III. REVIEWING RULE 703 TEN YEARS LATER
The 2000 amendment to Rule 703 emphasized that Rule 703 does not
serve as an exception to the other rules of evidence. 344 Instead, if an expert
relies on evidence that is not admissible, the evidence can be disclosed to
the jury only if the probative value of the evidence in evaluating the
expert’s opinion substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect of disclosing
the evidence. 345
As discussed in Part II.B., a review of federal court opinions considering
disclosure of inadmissible basis evidence during two-year periods before
and after the 2000 amendment suggests that there was a tendency toward
disclosure before the amendment, which was curbed somewhat by the
amendment to Rule 703.346 Even after the amendment, however, disclosure
can still be expected in a substantial number of cases. 347 As a result, the
debate over the proper treatment of inadmissible basis evidence and the
debate over the effectiveness of limiting instructions in this context retain
significance.
Despite longstanding criticism and doubtful efficacy, 348 limiting
instructions are used throughout the Rules of Evidence when the same
evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another.349
The limiting instruction contemplated by Rule 703 is problematic, however,
particularly in the context of hearsay. When otherwise inadmissible basis
evidence is disclosed under Rule 703, the evidence is admitted for the
limited purpose of evaluating the expert’s opinion.350 Thus, the jury must
341. See supra notes 335–39 and accompanying text; see also Ross Andrew Oliver, Note,
Testimonial Hearsay as the Basis for Expert Opinion: The Intersection of the Confrontation
Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 703 After Crawford v. Washington, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
1539, 1560 (2004) (suggesting a “continuum” with an expert who merely transmits others’
statements at one end, and an expert who provides a “truly original” opinion based on
diverse sources at the other end).
342. See supra notes 306–09 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.2.
344. See supra Part I.C.
345. FED. R. EVID. 703; see supra Part I.C.
346. See supra Part II.B.
347. See supra Part II.A.2.
348. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also Mnookin, supra note 296, at
812 (“Rules of limited admissibility are commonplace in evidence law.”)
350. See supra notes 128–30, 151–53, 157–59 and accompanying text.
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somehow use the inadmissible basis evidence to evaluate the expert’s
opinion, without considering whether or not the inadmissible basis evidence
is true. 351 Even outside the context of hearsay, allowing evidence that is
inadmissible under other rules to be disclosed via Rule 703 risks frustrating
the purpose of those rules. 352
Expert reliance on testimonial hearsay is particularly troubling. 353 Rule
703’s approach, however, invites Confrontation Clause violations, by
providing that an expert opinion can allow discussion of inadmissible
evidence.
Part III.A revisits amended Rule 703 after ten years’ experience, outside
of the context of the Confrontation Clause. It ultimately advocates a
modified version of the existing Rule’s approach that emphasizes the
unworkability of limiting instructions in the context of Rule 703. Part III.B
addresses Rule 703 in the Confrontation Clause context.
A. Acceptable Balancing
The proper treatment of inadmissible basis evidence under Rule 703
cannot be resolved merely by recognizing that juries cannot logically
distinguish between substantive use and evaluative use of inadmissible
basis evidence under Rule 703. Indeed, Professors Rice and Carlson both
agreed that limiting instructions are ineffective, 354 and from there took
opposite positions on the proper treatment of inadmissible basis
evidence. 355 Even if it is assumed that the distinction between substantive
use and evaluative use of inadmissible basis evidence is impossible for the
jury, at least three potential approaches remain, based on the three
approaches discussed in Part I.B.3. Ultimately, the restrictive and open
approaches are both unsatisfactory. The current balancing approach,
however, can still be expected to allow a substantial amount of disclosure.
It should be applied with an understanding that a limiting instruction likely
will be ineffective.
1. The Restrictive Approach
The restrictive approach would allow an expert on direct examination to
refer only to the sources of evidence upon which she relied, if the evidence
was not otherwise admissible. 356 This approach would solve the problem
of unworkable limiting instructions. However, the review of decisions on
disclosure in 2007 and 2008 demonstrates that inadmissible basis evidence
is disclosed in a substantial number of cases even though Rule 703 provides
a presumption against disclosure, 357 which reflects a judicial determination
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

See supra notes 128–30, 151–53, 157–59 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra notes 151–53, 157–59 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.3.a–b.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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that in many cases disclosure is important for the jury to understand the
expert opinion. 358
Perhaps in a nod in this direction, even Professor Carlson’s restrictive
approach would still have permitted some general disclosure of the expert’s
bases. 359 Without disclosure, the jury may be forced simply to choose an
expert to defer to, with little basis for its decision. 360 Consider a lawsuit in
which each party hires an expert on a certain topic. Each expert has
probably considered the same general types of information. As a result, if
the experts can only disclose the general types of inadmissible information
that they have relied on, then there may be no way for the jury to adequately
distinguish between the experts’ direct testimony. The plaintiff’s expert
may testify, “I consulted sources A, B, and C, and I conclude X.” The
defendant’s expert may instead testify “I consulted sources A, B, and C, and
I conclude Z.” Based on the direct testimony of the experts the jury may
simply be forced to choose an expert to defer to.
Moreover, even if disclosure were prohibited on direct examination, each
party would still be entitled to fully explore the basis of the other’s expert
on cross-examination. 361 Without a full opportunity for cross-examination,
a party could present an expert who relied on very weak information, and
the opponent would be helpless to expose the flaws. Prohibiting disclosure
of inadmissible basis evidence on direct testimony would thus prevent a
party from laying out an expert’s reasoning for the jury, while shifting the
explanation of the basis of the testimony to cross-examination. 362
2. The Open Approach
The open approach would treat expert testimony as an exception to the
other rules of evidence (or at least as an exception to the rule against
hearsay) for information that is reasonably relied on by an expert.363 This
approach would also solve the problem of unworkable limiting instructions,
because the evidence would be admitted for substantive use.
This approach, however, is also ultimately unacceptable, because it
admits too much. Consider Brennan, discussed above in Part II.B.1. In that
case, over the defendant’s objection, the court allowed a rehabilitation
specialist to testify that he had reviewed the plaintiff’s medical history, and
that two doctors had determined that the plaintiff suffered from “a
permanent partial impairment of eleven percent of the whole body.”364 The
plaintiff thereby appears to have succeeded in presenting the testimony of
an expert who has relied on and discloses the opinions of multiple other
experts, effectively presenting the testimony of several experts to the jury,
358. See supra notes 279, 284 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also supra note 327.
360. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 187–89, 221–27 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
364. Brennan v. Reinhart Institutional Foods, No. CIV97-4014, 1998 WL 2017925, at *1,
*3 (D.S.D. Sept. 17, 1998) (quoting the testimony of the specialist).
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while having to produce (and subject to cross-examination) only one of
them. 365
If the open approach had been adopted, the medical reports relied on by
the specialist would have been admitted (to the extent that the specialist had
reasonably relied on them) for substantive use not only by the jury but also
by the proponent of the expert. 366 The open approach could thus allow
experts to become gateways for large amounts of evidence, forcing the jury
to defer to the expert’s selection and evaluation of substantive evidence.367
3. A Modified Middle Way
This Note therefore advocates continuing along the compromise
course, 368 as modified in amended Rule 703. Ten years of experience with
the Rule demonstrates, however, that disclosure can still be expected in a
number of cases. 369 Indeed, disclosure should be expected. In many cases,
disclosure will be necessary to evaluate the expert. 370
The approach taken by Rule 703 should be modified in its application,
however, by a recognition of the probable ineffectiveness of limiting
instructions for the jury, particularly when the jury cannot permissibly use
the evidence in the same way that the expert did.371 In addition, Rule 703
as it exists now permits expert reliance on and disclosure of evidence
rendered inadmissible not just on hearsay grounds, but also for a variety of
other reasons. 372 Expert reliance and validation may alleviate concerns that
unreliable information may be disclosed to the jury through expert
testimony. 373 Expert reliance and validation do not, however, wash away
potential prejudice from evidence that is inadmissible for other reasons.374
For example, an expert may be capable of ignoring the prejudicial effects of
a subsequent remedial measure that is inadmissible under Rule 407. 375 But
if a court allows the expert to disclose such information to the jury, it
potentially frustrates the policy goals of Rule 407. Accordingly, courts
should take care to apply the presumption against disclosure in Rule 703,
with particular care to note when a limiting instruction will not be effective.
The 2000 amendment to Rule 703 serves an additional function, even
though disclosure can still occur (and even though juries may be incapable
of following limiting instructions, at least in some circumstances). Rule
703 makes clear that the basis evidence can only be admitted, if at all, for
the evaluative—not substantive—use. Even if a jury cannot make the
distinction, the idea of limited admissibility, however, is not restricted to
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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the jury. It also affects the actions of the parties and the court.376 The
proponent of the expert cannot argue that she has proved a fact by pointing
to inadmissible evidence that the expert relied on in forming an opinion.377
In addition, consider the example of Wolling, which is discussed in Part
II.B.2. During deliberations, the jury in Wolling asked to review the
medical records upon which the expert had relied. 378 The judge refused the
jury’s request, and explained that the expert had only described the medical
records to support his opinions. 379 If the open approach had been adopted,
the medical records would have been admitted into evidence for the
substantive use that the jury requested. By applying the limited
admissibility approach in Wolling, the district court permitted the proponent
of the expert to be clear that the expert had some basis for his opinion, but
the court also kept prejudicial records from the jury room. 380
The balancing approach of Rule 703, however modified, will not solve
the problem of expert reliance on testimonial hearsay, which is discussed in
the next section.
B. Unacceptable Disclosure
Rule 703’s current approach confuses the problem of expert reliance on
testimonial statements, by suggesting that an expert can disclose the
testimonial statements to the jury for a non-hearsay use. If both Rule 703
and the Supreme Court’s dictum in Crawford are taken at face value,
otherwise inadmissible statements are disclosed under Rule 703 only for
non-hearsay purposes, meaning that the Confrontation Clause is not
implicated.381 As commentators on both sides of the disclosure debate382
and the New York Court of Appeals 383 have correctly recognized, however,
if an expert relies upon an out of court statement for its truth, jurors cannot
possibly use the statement to evaluate the expert’s opinion unless they also
use it for the truth. 384 In addition, if they accept the expert’s opinion, they
implicitly accept the evidence used to reach it.385
Evaluating whether the expert has offered an independent opinion, which
is suggested as a possible approach in Justice Sotomayor’s Bullcoming
concurrence and in several Circuit Courts of Appeals’ decisions, 386 partially
sidesteps the problem of testimonial hearsay. Courts are right to be wary of
experts who serve as mere transmitters of hearsay. 387 In addition, if an
376. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
378. United States v. Wolling, 223 F. App’x 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2007).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. See supra notes 310–14 and accompanying text.
382. See supra Part II.B.3.a–b.
383. See supra Part II.C.2. At least the jury accepts the basis evidence underlying the
opinion in the aggregate; they need not endorse each individual item of evidence.
384. See People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–34 (N.Y. 2005).
385. See id.
386. See supra Part II.C.1, II.C.3.
387. See supra Part II.C.3.
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expert offers only an independent opinion without conveying the substance
of any testimonial statement, there may be no Confrontation Clause
concerns. 388
But an expert can provide an independent opinion and convey otherwise
inadmissible evidence to the jury. Indeed, that is the very situation that
Rule 703 addresses, and it was the situation encountered in Goldstein389
and in Leeson. 390 A psychiatrist, for example, can offer an opinion about a
defendant’s sanity, and convey hearsay to the jury in support of the opinion.
The hypothetical proposed by Justice Sotoymayor in Bullcoming appears to
be another such situation. 391 If an expert provides his own opinion, and
discusses another expert’s testimonial report in support of his opinion,392
the expert is both providing his independent opinion and conveying
testimonial hearsay to the jury. In these circumstances, the disclosure of
testimonial hearsay basis evidence should be recognized as a Confrontation
Clause violation, even if the expert also provides an independent opinion.
Thus, although the Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause
decisions did not “do away with Federal Rule of Evidence 703,” 393 the
compromises struck by Rule 703 should not be allowed to provide a route
for testimonial hearsay to reach the jury.
CONCLUSION
Rule 703 was amended in 2000 after a long debate on the proper
treatment of inadmissible evidence relied on by experts in forming their
opinions. Ten years of experience with the amended Rule demonstrates
that disclosure of otherwise inadmissible evidence can still be expected in a
substantial number of cases. In most instances, Rule 703 should continue
substantially as before, but with an additional judicial emphasis on the
ineffectiveness of limiting instructions under the Rule. In addition, even if
disclosure of otherwise inadmissible evidence occurs, the amendment to
Rule 703 emphasizes to the court and the parties that the evidence should
only be used to evaluate the expert’s opinion. In cases involving expert
reliance on testimonial statements, the compromises struck by Rule 703
should not be allowed to provide a route to the jury for testimonial hearsay.

388. See supra notes 330–31, 341 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Part II.C.2.
390. See supra notes 280–84 and accompanying text.
391. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part).
392. Id.
393. United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2010).

